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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
during times when rights may be curtailed.2 - It is submitted that the rela-
tive worth of informing the people of matters in which they have an
interest as citizens, as compared to the personal right of the individual
not to have his public acts freely commented on, should be considered in
deciding whether, in times of national unrest especially, the privilege of
fair comment is to be preserved.
25
E. S. D.
TORTS-PROXIMATE CAus--CITY's FAxIURE TO MAINTAIN SMEWALK-
[Missouri].The defendant city failed to maintain a sidewalk, as a result
of which the plaintiff, a child, decided to cross the street to the sidewalk
on the opposite side. In crossing, she was struck by an automobile negli-
gently driven byl a third party. Held, that the alleged negligence of the
city was the remote, and not the proximate cause of the injury. Smith v.
Mabrey.'
In order to attach liability for a negligent act, the act must be the
proximate cause of the injury.2 There are two accepted tests for deter-
24. In a case holding that to say a politician was a member of the Com-
munist party was not defamatory per se, the court said: "To deprive our
citizens of the right freely to debate political issues or to allude to the
political affiliations of others, is to make a breach in the dike which pro-
tects our cherished institutions. Far better is it to preserve that right
unhampered-even with the abuses which frequently attend its exercise in
the heat of political passion-than to limit it at the possible loss of our
constitutional liberties." Garriga v. Richfield (1940) 174 Misc. 315, 320, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 544, 549.
25. "To make the critic's protection depend not only upon the sincerity
of his criticism but also upon its being such as a reasonable man might
make would tend to prevent the public from knowing much essential criti-
cism. The advantages gained by the freedom of discussion stated in this
Section are therefore sufficient to outweigh the danger that the reputation
of public officers or candidates may suffer thereby." Restatement, Torts
(1938) §607, comment c.
1. (Mo. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 770.
2. Scheffer v. R. R. Co. (1881) 105 U. S. 249; Setter's Adm'r v. City
of Maysville (1902) 114 Ky. 60, 69 S. W. 1074; Eaton v. Wallace (Mo.
1926) 287 S. W. 614, 48 A. L. R. 1291; Madden v. Red Line Service (Mo.
1934) 76 S. W. (2d) 435 (Mere occurrence of the negligence does not create
liability, but the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.)
Hull v. Thomson Transfer Co. (1909) 135 Mo. App. 119, 115 S. W. 1054;
Grace v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. (1912) 167 Mo. 109, 150 S. W. 1092;
Jacquith v. Fayette R. Plumb. Inc. (Mo. 1923) 254 S. W. 89; Kennedy v.
Independent Quarry and Const. Co. (1926) 316 Mo. 782, 291 S. W. 475;
George v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1926) 286 S. W. 130;
Stokes v. Springfield Wagon Co. (Mo. App. 1927) 289 S. W. 987; Cregger
v. City of St. Charles (1928) 224 Mo. App. 232, 11 S. W. (2d) 750; Evans
v. Massman Const. Co. (1938) 343 Mo. 632, 122 S. W. (2d) 924 (Reversing
232 Mo. App. 1105, 115 S. W. (2d) 163). (Proximate cause of the injury
or event is that which in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any event and without which injury or event would not have occurred.)
Butz v. Cavanaugh (1897) 133 Mo. 503, 38 S. W. 1104, 59 Am. St. Rep.
504; Yongue v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (1908) 133 Mo. App. 141, 112
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mining when a negligent act is the proximate cause of the injury: whether
the injury that resulted could have been foreseen by a reasonably prudent
man,8 and whether the resultant injury was the natural and probable re-
sult of the negligent act.4 Missouri, following the general tendency, has
abandoned the foresight test in most cases and has accepted the hindsight
rule as being most satisfactory.5 This has been the accepted rule in deter-
mining proximate cause in England since the case of Smith v. London
S. W. RV. Co., decided in 1870.0 Both tests are frequently applied in deter-
mining when an intervening act of a third person breaks the chain of
legal causation between the original negligent act and the injury.7
In the instant case, liability could have been decided without any refer-
ence to the issue of proximate cause, inasmuch as the court found that
the defendant city was not negligent with respect to the failure to build
the sidewalk. The issue was discussed only because the court, apparently
not too sure of its ground on the negligence question, was willing to assume
that the city was negligent. With such an assumption, the case reduces
itself to a pattern of facts that bear comparison with a group of prior
Missouri cases in which the same issue of causation was decided in favor
of the plaintiff. The court was thus driven to distinguish those cases from
the present. In those cases, the plaintiffs, who had been forced to walk in
the street by reason of an obstruction on the sidewalk, were struck by a
negligently driven car. The obstruction had been placed on the sidewalk,
in violation of an ordinance, during the construction of a building. The
S. W. 985; Jackson v. Butler (1913) 249 Mo. 342, 155 S. W. 1071; State
ex rel. National Newspaper's Ass'n v. Ellison (Mo. 1915) 176 S. W. 11
(Only such acts that bear such a causal connection to the injury or event
are actionable.)
3. Brubaker v. Kansas City Electric Co. (1908) 130 Mo. App. 1139,
110 S. W. 12; DeMoss v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (1922) 296 Mo. 246, 246
S. W. 566; Coy v. Dean (1928) 222 Mo. App. 67, 4 S. W. (2d) 835; Cregger
v. City of St. Charles (1929) 224 Mo. App. 232, 11 S. W. (2d) 750.
4. Smith v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat, and Power Co. (1925) 310
Mo. App. 467, 276 S. W. 607; Helton v. Hawkins (1927) 221 Mo. App.
93, 290 S. W. 91; Prosser, Torts (1941) 318; Green, Rationale of Proximate
Cause (1927) 177-185 §9; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911) 25
Harv. L. Rev. 103, 114-128.
5. For old Missouri ruling: Saxton v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1903) 98
Mo. 92, 72 S. W. 717; McDonald v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. (1909) 219
Mo. 468, 118 S. W. 78; Johnson v. Ambusson Hydraulic Const. Co. (1915)
188 Mo. 105, 173 S. W. 1081; State ex rel Lusk v. Ettison (1917) 271 Mo.
463, 196 S. W. 1088. For present Missouri ruling: Holloway v. Barnes
Grocer Co. (1929) 223 Mo. App. 1026, 15 S. W. (2d) 917; Scott v. American
Mfg. Co. (Mo. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 592; Reugsegger v. Chicago, Great West-
ern Ry. Co. (1930) 225 Mo. App. 211, 29 S. W. (2d) 221; Phillips v.
Yellow Cab Co. (1931) 225 Mo. App. 1172, 36 S. W. (2d) 419.
6. (1870) 23 L. T. R. 678, 6 C. P. 14, 20, "It may be that they did not
anticipate that the plaintiff's cottage would be burned as a result of their
negligence, but I think that the law is, * * * defendants are bound to
provide against all circumstances which might result from this, and were
responsible for the natural consequences of it."
7. Demoss v. Kansas City Bys. Co. (1922) 296 Mo. 526, 246 S. W. 566;
Coy v. Dean (1928) 222 Mo. App. 67, 4 S. W. (2d) 835.
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court held that the city had notice of the obstruction as it had been there
for some time, and that its failure to see that a safe passage was provided
for the pedestrians was the proximate cause of the injury.8
The court distinguished the previous cases on the ground that in these
cases the sidewalk already existed and was negligently maintained, while
in the present case no sidewalk was contemplated, and the alleged breach
of duty was therefore of a lesser degree. However, since the court as-
sumed negligence in the instant case, and in so doing admitted a breach
of duty, it seems somewhat illogical to distinguish the cases on the issue
of causation by reopening the issue of negligence.9
A better approach to the problem of causation would have been to con-
sider the purpose of the sidewalk, and, in the light of that purpose, the
nature of the hazards that might be regarded as falling within the natural
and probable consequences of the failure to maintain a sidewalk.10 Is
the sidewalk merely a convenience that is furnished by the city, or is it
a safety device to protect the pedestrian? The locale of the sidewalk may
be the determining factor, depending upon whether it is in a congested
traffic area or along a seldom traveled street. This will determine the
"risk of harm," "danger," or "hazard" which will come within the scope
of the duty to protect from injury.'
It is difficult to understand the grounds upon which the court held the
negligence of the city to be too remote from the injury to be, by any
possibility, the proximate cause of the injury. In any event there is ques-
tion raised in the case which reasonable men might answer differently. The
decision as to proximate cause should have been left to the jury.12
M. O'B. I.
WILLS-HOLOGRAPHS-WHAT CONSTITUTES "ALL IN TESTATOR'S HANDWRIT-
ING"-[Tennessee].-An instrument found among testator's valuable papers
was offered for probate. It was entirely in the testator's handwriting except
for the fact that it contained his wife's signature as well as his own. The
judge of the county court held that because of the wife's signature the will
was not entirely in the handwriting of the testator as required by the
8. Lindman v. Kansas City (1925) 308 Mo. 161, 271 S. W. 516; Shafir
v. Carroll (1925) 309 Mo. 458, 274 S. W. 755; Strother v. Seiben (1926) 220
Mo. App. 1027, 282 S. W. 502; Strother v. Carroll (Mo. 1926) 287 S. W.
310. These cases arose from the same incident mentioned in the text.
Stollhans v. City of St. Louis (1938) 343 Mo. 467, 121 S. W. (2d) 808.
(The court imputed liability to the city, though its negligence was incapable
of inflicting injury without the intervening negligent act.)
9. Smith v. Mabrey (Mo. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 770.
10. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927) 11-13, §3 "The law
never gives complete and absolute protection to any interest. The problem
therefore is, in any case, whether the particular hazard falls within the
radius of protection thrown about the interest."
11. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. (1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E.
99, 59 A. L. R. 1253; Harper, The Law of Torts (1938) 79-80, §44.
12. Frese v. Wells (Mo. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 652; Prosser, Torts (1941)
873-374.
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